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  • #16
    It is very true Redwine, LSD is for the nontoxic, only the judgements one makes while high are dangerous. However under the supervision of a psychologist this is not a threat.

    Stanislav Grof's books on LSD are great reads. He was an Czech scientist who experimented with LSD. His books, The Holotropic Mind, and The Adventure of Self-Discovery, are filled with examples of ppl who have taken LSD, there bizarre yet interesting experiences and how it helped them psychologically.

    It is a shame that LSD is illegal in the US, as its potential benefits far outweigh its negative consequences.

    I believe Grof figured some natural breathing techniques to replicate the effects of LSD??? I think he gives classes on the stuff somewhere in California.


    • #17

      morphine, principal derivative of opium, which is the juice in the unripe seed pods of the opium poppy, Papaver somniferum. It was first isolated from opium in 1803 by the German pharmacist F. W. A. Sertürner, who named it after Morpheus, the god of dreams. Given intravenously, it is still considered the most effective drug for the relief of pain.

      Morphine the principal active agent in opium, is a powerful opioid analgesic drug. According to recent research, it may also be produced naturally by the human brain.Like other opiates, morphine acts directly on the central nervous system to relieve pain, and at synapses of the arcuate nucleus, in particular. Side effects include impairment of mental performance, euphoria, drowsiness, lethargy, and blurred vision. It also decreases hunger, inhibits the cough reflex, and produces constipation. Morphine is usually highly addictive, and tolerance and physical and psychological dependence develop quickly. Patients on morphine often report insomnia and nightmares.

      Morphine is frequently found in various preparations.

      Parenterally it is given as subcutaneous, intravenous, or epidural injections. The military sometimes issues morphine loaded in an autoinjector.

      Orally, it comes as an elixir or in tablet form. Morphine is rarely in suppository form.

      Morphine is used legally in the following :

      the relief of acute, severe pain
      pain after surgery
      pain associated with trauma
      the relief of moderate to severe chronic pain
      cancer pain
      tooth extraction
      as an adjunct to general anesthesia
      in epidural anesthesia
      relief of pain in palliative care


      • #18
        i used to smoke weed alot quit it on january 23rd 2003, smoekd again 3 sticks on july 18th 2004 in atlanta and would do it again anytime when i am in the u.s.

        my messege is: smoke weed every day. be high every night


        • #19
          chasm hatman. montazere ejaazat boodim.


          • #20
            Risks of non-medical abuse of heroin

            Overdose, sometimes fatal
            For intravenous abusers (people who inject) of heroin, the use of non-sterile needles and syringes and other materials leads to the risk of contracting blood-borne pathogens such as HIV and/or hepatitis infections as well as the risk of contracting bacterial or fungal endocarditis
            Poisoning from contaminants added to "cut" or dilute heroin
            Many countries and local governments have instituted programs to supply sterile needles to people who inject illegal drugs in order to reduce some of these contingent risks. While needle exchanges have demonstrated an immediate public health benefit, some see such programs as tacit acceptance of illicit drug use. The United States does not support needle exchanges federally by law, though some of its state and local governments do.

            A heroin overdose is usually treated with an opioid antagonist, such as naloxone (Narcan) or naltrexone, which have a high affinity for opioid receptors but do not activate them. This blocks heroin and other opioid agonists and causes an immediate return of consciousness and start of withdrawal symptoms when administered intraveneously. The half-life of these antagonists is usually much shorter than that of the opiate drugs they are used to block, so the antagonist usually has to be re-administered multiple times until the opiate has been metabolized by the body.

            Contrary to popular belief, a heroin overdose is not fast-acting. Stories about people who "OD with the needle still in their arm" and the like are not attributable to heroin overdoses, but rather they are very often the result of a fatal reaction with the adulterant. Quinine is notorious for causing such deaths. In the case of an actual heroin overdose, it very often takes many hours to die.

            Heroin overdoses are more rare than one might first expect. As noted above, an overdose is immediately reversible with an opioid antagonist injection. The overwhelmingly vast majority of reported heroin overdoses are actually adulterant poisonings or fatal interactions with alcohol or methadone. True overdoses are rare because the LD50 for a person already addicted is prohibitively high, to the point that there is no general medical consensus on where to place it. Several studies done in the 1920s gave addicts doses of 1,600–1,800 mg of heroin in one sitting, and no adverse effects were reported. This is approximately 160–180 times a normal recreational dose. Even for a non-addict, the LD50 can be credibly placed above 350 mg.

            It should be noted, however, that street heroin is of widely varying and unpredictable purity. This means that an addict may prepare what they consider to be a moderate dose while actually taking far more than intended. Also, relapsing addicts after a period of abstinence have tolerances below what they were during active addiction. If a dose comparable to their previous use is taken an overdose often results.


            • #21

              The withdrawal syndrome from heroin (or any other short-acting opioid) can begin within 6 hours of discontinuation of sustained use of the drug: sweating, malaise, anxiety, depression, persistent and intense penile erection in males (priapism), general feeling of heaviness, cramp-like pains in the limbs, yawning and lachrymation, sleep difficulties, cold sweats, chills, severe muscle and bone aches not precipitated by any physical trauma, nausea and vomiting, diarrhea, gooseflesh (hence, the term "cold turkey"), cramps, and fever occur. Many addicts also complain of a painful condition, the so-called "itchy blood", which often results in compulsive scratching that causes bruises and sometimes ruptures the skin leaving scabs. Abrupt termination of heroin use causes muscle spasms in the legs of the user (restless leg syndrome), hence the term "kicking the habit". However, it must be noted that each person's symptoms can be unique. Users seeking to take the "cold turkey" (without any preparation or accompaniments) approach are generally more likely to experience the negative effects of withdrawal in a more pronounced manner.

              Two general approaches are available to ease opioid withdrawal. The first is to substitute a longer-acting opioid such as methadone or buprenorphine for heroin or another short-acting opioid and then slowly taper the dose. The other approach, which can be used alone or in combination, is to relieve withdrawal symptoms with non-opioid medications.

              In the second approach, benzodiazepines such as diazepam (Valium) ease the often extreme anxiety of opioid withdrawal. The most common benzodiazepine employed as part of the detox protocol in these situations is oxazepam (Serax). However, it is important to note that benzodiazepine use may also lead to a dependence, and many opiate addicts also abuse other central nervous system depressants including benzodiazepines and barbituates. Also, though unpleasant, opiate withdrawal seldom has potential to become fatal, whereas complications related to withdrawal from benzodiazepines, barbiturates and alcohol (such as seizures, cardiac arrest, and delirium tremens) can prove hazardous and potentially fatal. Many symptoms of opioid withdrawal are due to rebound hyperactivity of the sympathetic nervous system, and this can be suppressed with clonidine (Catapres), a centrally-acting alpha-2 agonist primarily used to treat hypertension.

              Buprenorphine is one of the most recent opioid agonist/antagonist used for treating addiction. It develops tolerance much slower than heroin or methadone. It also has a withdrawal many times softer than heroin and other opioids. It can be admnistered up to every 24-48 hrs. By itself buprenorphine has low overdose dangers. Buprenorphine is a kappa-opioid receptor antagonist. This gives the drug an anti-depressant effect, increasing physical and intellectual activity.

              Methadone is another μ-opioid agonist often used to substitute for heroin in treatment for heroin addiction. Compared to heroin, methadone is well (but slowly) absorbed orally and has a much longer duration of action. Thus methadone maintenance avoids the rapid cycling between intoxication and withdrawal associated with heroin addiction. In this way, methadone has shown some success as a "less harmful substitute"; despite being much more addictive than heroin, and is recommended for those who have repeatedly failed to complete detoxification. As of 2005, the μ-opioid agonist buprenorphine is also being used to manage heroin addiction, being a superior, though still imperfect and not yet widely known alternative to methadone. Note that methadone, since it is longer-acting, produces withdrawal symptoms that are usually less severe and that appear later than with heroin, but may last longer.

              Researchers have discovered two types of opioid antagonists: naloxone and the longer-acting naltrexone. These two medications block the effects of heroin, as well as the other opioids at the receptor site. Recent studies have suggested that the addition of naloxone and naltrixone may improve the success rate in treatment programs when combined with the traditional therapy.

              The University of Chicago undertook preliminary development of a heroin vaccine in monkeys during the 1970s, but it was abandoned. There were two main reasons for this. Firstly, when immunised monkeys had an increase in dose of x16, their antibodies became saturated and the monkey had the same effect from heroin as non-immunised monkeys. Secondly, until they reached the x16 point immunised monkeys would substitute other drugs to get a heroin-like effect. These factors suggested that immunised human addicts would simply either take massive quantities of heroin, or switch to other hard drugs, which is known as cross-tolerance.

              There also is a controversial treatment for heroin addiction based on an African drug, ibogaine. Many people travel abroad for ibogaine treatments that generally stop the addiction for 3 months or more.


              • #22

                Cocaine addiction is the obsessive or uncontrollable abuse of cocaine. Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) shows promising results. Spiritual based Twelve-step programs such as Cocaine Anonymous (modeled on Alcoholics Anonymous) have some success combatting this problem. A cocaine vaccine is also being tested which may prevent the recipient from feeling the desirable effects of the drug, although a similar effort to develop a heroin vaccine was abandoned as ineffective in the 1970s.

                Cocaine has positive reinforcement effects, which refers to the effect that certain stimuli have on behavior. Good feelings become associated with the drug, causing a frequent user to take the drug as a response to bad news or mild depression. This activation strengthens the response that was just made. If the drug was taken by a fast acting route such as injection or inhalation, the response will be the act of taking more cocaine, so the response will be reinforced. Powder cocaine, being a club drug is most commonly available in the evening and night hours. Since cocaine is a stimulant, a user will often drink large amounts of alcohol during and after usage or smoke marijuana to dull the effects to help one achieve slumber. These several hours of temporary relief and pleasure will further reinforce the positive response. Other downers such as heroin and various pharmaceuticals are often used for the same purpose, further increasing addiction potential and harmfulness.

                It is speculated that cocaine's addictive properties stem from its DAT-blocking effects (in particular, increasing the dopaminergic transmission from ventral tegmental area neurons). However, a study has shown that mice with no dopamine transporters still exhibit the rewarding effects of cocaine administration . Later work demonstrated that a combined DAT/SERT knockout eliminated the rewarding effects . The rewarding effects of cocaine are influenced by circadian rhythms , possibly by involving a set of genes termed "clock genes"


                • #23
                  استفاده از آمپولهاو قرص‌هاي جديد اعتياد آور، مرگ مدرن

                  استفاده از آمپول‌هاي روان گردان و قرص‌هاي مواد مخدر شيميايي جديدي به نام كريستال يا شيشه در ميان جوانان در كشور بويژه شهرستان كرمانشاه رو به افزايش است.

                  پزشكان متخصص از اين پديده به عنوان مرگ مدرن نام مي‌برند.

                  اثرات اين داروهاي اعتياد آور شيميايي به گونه‌اي است كه با يك الي دو بار مصرف آن امكان درمان آن غير ممكن است و تا مدت‌ها به راحتي قابل تشخيص نسيت.

                  اين مواد شميايي مخدر و انواع قرص به علت اينكه در آب حل شده و بي‌رنگ و بي‌بو هستند در مجالس از آنها با عنوان مواد نيروزا، قرص‌هاي لاغري به جوانان و نوجوانان داده مي‌شود.

                  اثرات آن معمولا از نيم ساعت بعد شروع و گاها بعضي از آمبول‌هاي روان گردان تا شش ساعت باقي مي‌ماند.

                  گروه تزريقي اين آمپول‌ها "تمجيزك، نورجيزك، اورجيزك، جسنور" نام دارند و عمدتا از كشورهاي پاكستان و افغانستان وارد كشور مي‌شوند و با نام تجاري بوپورفين، كه ماده‌اي شيميايي قويتر از مورفين است شناخته مي‌شوند.

                  ايجاد سرخوشي، افزايش تمايل به برقراري ارتباط با ديگران، كاهش شرم و حيا و احساس بالاي لذت عشق و دوستي از پيامدهاي استفاده از اين مواد است.

                  عوارض ناشي از مصرف آن تهوع، استفراغ، خواب آلودگي، گيجي، خشكي‌دهان، مشكلات شديد تنفسي است.

                  يك سري مواد مخدر جديد به نام كريستال، شيشه و يا يخ وارد بازار شده كه تركيبي از كوكائين و هروئين است، اين مواد پودر سفيد مايل به خاكستري كه در داخل آب حل مي‌شود و بي‌بو و بي‌رنگ است و به سادگي قابل تشخيص نيست.

                  اين مواد در بعضي از مجالس و مهماني‌ها به خورد جوانان داده مي‌شود و با عنوان قرض‌هاي لاغري و دانه‌هاي ژلاتيني به فروش مي‌رسد و انواع آن به صورت سيگار و مواد مخدر خوراكي، مانند شكلات و يا آدامس يافت مي‌شود.

                  بر اساس برخي آمارها‪ ۵۰‬درصد حملات مسلحانه، ‪ ۳۴‬درصد تصادفات ناشي از خواب آلوگي، ‪ ۳۰‬درصد حوادث اتومبيل، ‪ ۱۲‬درصد از خودكشي‌ها و ‪ ۱۱‬درصد از بيماري قلبي و عروقي به خاطر مصرف اين مواد مخدر است.

                  قرض‌هاي اكستازي كه از مشتقات آمفتامين كه قرض‌هاي شادي آور هستند باعث شادي غير عاددي در فرد مي‌شود، بررسي‌ها نشان مي‌دهد.

                  قيمت اين قرض‌ها در ايران بين ‪ ۲۰‬تا ‪ ۴۰‬هزار ريال است كه درميان جواناني كه از اين نوع قرص‌هامصرف مي‌كنند به قرص‌هاي مرسدس بنز، ميسيوبيشي و دلار معروف است.

                  اثرات اين داور معمولا تا بيست دقيقه بعد از مصرف ظاهر مي‌شود و تا دو الي سه ساعت باقي مي‌ماند.

                  يكي از اثرات آن احساس روشنايي شديد گشاد شدن مردمك چشم است به طوري كه استفادكنندگان از اين نوع قرص‌ها مجبور مي‌شوند حتي در اتاق كاملا تاريك عينك آفتابي بزنند.

                  عارضه ديگر آن افزايش ضربان قلب و فشار خون است و فك زدن‌هاي مكرر كه ساعت‌ها ادامه دارد و طرف مجبور مي‌شود كه آدامس مصرف كند و گاها ديده مي‌شود در صورت در دسترس نبود آدامس ، افراد مجبور مي‌شوند كه زبان خود را زخم كنند.

                  پزشكان متخصص معتقدند كه افرادي كه سابقه بيماريهاي قلبي، فشار خون و يا سابقه بيماريهاي افسردگي را دارند، توصيه مي‌شود كه به هيچ وجه از اين داروها استفاده نكنند، چرا كه ممكن است باعث مرگ آني بشود.

                  تغيير دادن گروه دوستان، تغيير در ساعت خواب، افت تحصيلي، از دست دادن علاقه به ورزش‌و رفتارهاي خشن و پرخشگرانه، بي‌تفاوتي به اهداف زندگي خيره شدن به يك نقطه و فك زدن‌هاي مكرر از علام استفاده اين داورها است.

                  متاسفانه در زمان حاضر مصرف اين گونه داروها هيچ پادزهري ندارد و استفاده چندين بار از آنها قابل درمان نيست.

                  مسوولان قضايي و بهداشتي استان كرمانشاه از افزايش اين نوع داروها در ميان دانش آموزان، جوانان به ويژه دختران كرمانشاهي اظهار نگراني مي‌كنند.

                  رييس دانشگاه علوم پزشكي استان كرمانشاه گفت : در حدود پنج سالي است كه استفاده از آمپول‌هاي روان گردان و قرض‌هاي شادي آور در ميان دانش آموزان كرمانشاهي رايج شده است.

                  "بابك ايزدي" افزود : اين نوع داروهاي شيميايي اعتياد آور باتوجه به اينكه استاندارد نيستند، و در آزمايشگاه‌هاي با تجهيزات كم تهيه مي‌شوند احتمال آلودگي دارند و گاها باعث مرگ آني مي‌شوند.

                  وي افزود : متاسفانه اين داروها با قيمت ارزان و به راحتي در بازار يافت مي‌شوند و از طرفي ديگر ابزار و آلات مواد اعتياد آور قديمي را ندارد و به راحتي مي‌توان از آن استفاده كرد.

                  وي با اشاره به اينكه مصرف اين نوع مواد مخدرهاي شيميايي احتياج به ابزاري مصرفي خاصي ندارد، به شهروندان توصيه كرد : از فرزندان خود مراقبت كنند چرا كه ممكن است گرفتار شوند و خانواده‌ها مدتها متوجه اين مسئله نشوند.

                  به گفته وي، هرگونه تغيير در رفتار و اخلاق و يا افسردگي و شادي بيش از حد ممكن است از علام اعتياد فرزندان باشد و مردم متوجه باشند كه با مصرف دو الي سه بار ، فرزندانشان گرفتار دام اعتياد خطرناكي مي‌شوند.

                  يك مقام قضايي از توزيع و گستردش آمپول‌هاي روان گردان درميان دانش آموزان كرمانشاهي خبر داد.

                  بازپرس شعبه هفتم دادسراي عمومي انقلاب كرمانشاه افزود : فروشندگان اين نوع آمپول‌ها در ميان دانش آموزان دختر و پسر رخنه كرده و استفاده از آن به صورت نگران‌كننده اي رايج شده است.

                  "سيد سعيد حيدري طيب" افزود : بيشتر اين آمپول‌ها در غالب مواد آمپول‌هاي نيرو زا به فروش مي‌رسد.

                  وي تاكيد كرد : متاسفانه با استفاده از نخستين آمپول فرد معتاد مي‌شود و تا چندين سال اين وضعيت براي خانواده‌ها مشخص نيست.

                  وي با بيان اينكه بيشتر اين آمپول‌ها از كشورهاي اروپايي به ايران وارد مي‌شود، افزود : در كرمانشاه اين آمپول‌ها شبيه‌سازي مي‌شوند كه استفاده از آن بسيار خطرناك تر است.

                  وي تاكيد كرد : هر چند علم پزشكي پيشرفت زيادي كرده است، اما درمان اين نوع معتادي بنا به گفته پزشكان بسيار سخت است.

                  حيدري طيب از خانواده‌ها خواست كه به شدت از فرزندان خود مراقبت كنند و مواظبت باشند كه فرزندان آنها گرفتار اين پديده هولناك نشوند.

                  وي تاكيد كرد : متاسفانه بر اساس پرونده‌هايي كه به دادگستري كرمانشاه ارسال مي‌شود، تعداد استفاده‌كنندگان از اين نوع آمپول‌ها در ميان دختران بيشتر است.
                  نه غزه نه لبنان جانم فدای ایران

                  «در زندگی زخم*هايی هست که مثل خوره روح را آهسته در انزوا می*خورد و می*تراشد.»
                  صادق هدايت؛ بوف کور


                  • #24
                    Fake drugs caught inside the pack

                    A new technique can trace counterfeit drugs while they are still in their packs, UK government scientists say.
                    A study published in the journal Analytical Chemistry said the new laser technique could examine the contents of blister packs and bottles.

                    A company will develop applications of the technique.

                    A spokesman for the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) said: "This is something we will watch with interest".

                    Raman spectroscopy - a technique which analyses changes in laser light bouncing off molecules to indicate their chemical composition - is already used to identify the chemical composition of samples and can be used with battery-operated hand-held instruments.


                    However, it does not always work through some forms of packaging, and has not been feasible with non-transparent plastic bottles until now.

                    But in the Analytical Chemistry paper, Doctors Charlotte Eliasson and Pavel Matousek from the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory, run by the Council for the Central Laboratory of the Research Councils (CCLRC) said the new technique - called Spatially Offset Raman Spectroscopy (SORS) can investigate the contents of blister packs and plastic bottles without opening them.

                    SORS involves changing the alignment of the laser instrument so that light is gathered from areas away from where the laser hits the sample.

                    This shows up the chemical composition of the drugs - meaning that experts can see if their make-up is correct or not.

                    In a report on SORS last year, a team of scientists including some from Rutherford Appleton, and ICI said it could be used to identify "substances beneath surfaces" and foresaw its use to analyse the internal composition of bones and tissues, jewellery and industrial materials.

                    World Health Organization statistics indicate that 30% of medicines supplied in developing countries are fake; in some East European countries the proportion is 10%.


                    "We're always looking at new ways of combating counterfeiting," an ABPI spokesman said.

                    In developing countries the problem was rife, he said - adding that the main risk in the UK arose from medicines bought without prescription on the internet.

                    The government's Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) says it operates Europe's largest scheme of spot-checks on medicines, but adds: "It is recognised that no supply chain is impenetrable."

                    A spokeswoman for the MHRA said that in general it welcomed anything which kept counterfeit medicines off the market - but would not comment on the SORS technique until the agency had been able to assess it.


                    • #25
                      به گزارش شبکه خبر fcnn به نقل از روز مدیرکل مبارزه با مواد مخدرنیروی انتظامی ازاستفاده برخی مواد جدید توسط جوانان خبرداده است. به گفته او "کرک" و"کریستال" دوماده مخدری هستند که توسط جوانان مورد استفاده قرار می گیرد. مواد یاد شده از نظر صدمه زایی، از هرویین نیز خطرناک تر هستند.

                      نیروی انتظامی اعلام کرده است که ميزان کشفيات مواد مخدر و مشروبات الكلي طي هفت ماه نخست امسال نسبت به مدت مشابه سال گذشته 70 درصد افزايش يافته* و عمده تلاش اين نيرو بر شناسايي باندهاي سازمان يافته فساد متمرکز شد ه *است.

                      حمید رضا حسن آبادی که خبرگزاری مهر گفته است که مبارزه با "کراک"، "کریستال" و" هرویین" اولویت های نیروی انتظامی را به خود اختصاص می دهد. این درحالی است که با توجه به شکل این مواد وقابلیت فشرده بودن آنها، عملا امکان کشف و کنترل ان بسیار دشوار تراز مواد مخدر دیگر است.

                      به علاوه قرص*هاي اكستازي و روانگردان*های کشف شده که هم اکنون نگرانی بسیاری ازخانواده ها را موجب شده است، اغلب از اروپا، تركيه و بنادر جنوبي و آمپول*هاي مرفين از كشور پاكستان وارد كشور مي*شوند. به گفته مسئولین حوزه مواد مخدر هم اكنون بيش از يكهزار نوع قرص* اكستازي صنعتي و توهم*زا كه انسان را از حالت طبيعي خارج مي*كند، در كشور وجود دارد. ابعاد این مساله آنچنان بزرگ است که حتی با وجود مشکلاتی که درزمینه کشف این مواد وجود دارد تنها درنیمه اول سال جاری ، 337 هزار و 483 آمپول مرفين و 300 هزار و 334 عدد انواع قرص*هاي روانگردان و اكستازي از قاچاقچيان كشف شده است.

                      علی هاشمی رییس ستاد مبارزه با مواد مخدر پیش ازاین اعلام کرده بود که تعداد مبتلایان به مواد مخدر در کشور دومیلیون نفر است. از نظر کارشناسان با رقم های واقعی فاصله بسیاری دارد. طبق امارهای ارائه شده توسط مسئولین مرتبط با مواد مخدر، سن اعتیاد درایران بین 29 تا 39 سال است.

                      صرصامی مشاور علی هاشمی گفته است که براي پيشگيري از گسترش مواد مخدر "قراراست به زودی زمينه اطلاع*رساني پيرامون موادمخدر براي 15 ميليون نفر دانش*آموز از طريق آموزش و پرورش با تهيه جزوه*هاي آموزشي فراهم خواهد بیاید.

                      کارشناسان دولتي مي گويند برخورداری از مرزی با بیش از 900 کیلومتر با افغانستان عملا کنترل مواد مخدر را درک غیرممکن کرده است. اين در حالي است که طی سالهای گذشته به دلیل ارزان تر شدن برخی مواد مخدر مانند هرویین وتریاک، عملا سطح قوت مصرف افزایش چشمگیری پیدا کرده است.


                      • #26
                        هنوز صد سال نشده، هنوز از خاطره ها نرفته كه چگونه ترياك جاي خود را در ميان ايرانيان باز كرد، انگليسي ها سوخته آن را مي خريدند و مردم به ترياكي شدن تشويق مي شدند، چپق و قليان از مد افتاده بودند و ترياك وافور مد شد، اما همانگونه كه زمان از توقف باز نمي ايستد و هر روز اختراع و اكتشاف جديدي مي شود و هر روز چيزي براي تعجب كردن و انگشت حيرت به دهان گرفتن انسان ها پيدا مي شود مخدر ها هم روز به روز به روز شدند و نشئه شدن ها هم به روزتر شد، روزگاري با پك زدن هاي عميق به وافور، زماني ديگر با استنشاق گردهاي سفيد هروئين بر روي زرورق يا تزريق آن!
                        اسم ها هم به روز شدند ترياك سنتي و طبيعي رو به فراموشي مي رود چون هم قديمي است و هم بي كلاس است و كراك و شيشه و پان مدرن و صنعتي طرفدار پيدا كرده است.
                        جوانان هم ترياك و هروئين را مخدر مي دانند و كراك و شيشه را مخدر نمي دانند شايد چيزي مي دانند در حد يك قليان آن هم از نوع ميوه اي اش پس ترس و ابائي براي عدم مصرف آن ندارند و يا يك قرص نشاط آور تا ساعتي به اصطلاح خوش باشند و حال كنند، سلامت نيوز در نگاهي كوتاه به معرفي و بررسي عوارض مصرف كراك كه مصرف آن امروزه بين جوانان ‪۱۷‬تا ‪ ۲۵‬سال رو به افزايش است مي پردازد.
                        كراك ايراني خطرناك تر از كراك خارجي !
                        كراك اصل نوعي از مواد مخدر است از الكالوئيدهاي دسته كوكائين، انرژي زا و شادي آور است و هيچگونه اعتيادي را در فرد مصرف كننده ايجاد نمي كند، ولي موادي كه با نام كراك در ايران توزيع ميشود كراك اصل نيست ، بلكه هروئين غليظ شده است كه توسط مافياي روسيه توليد و درايران پخش ميشود .
                        در ايران كراك در آزمايشگاههاي مخفي و خانگي با فشرده*كردن هروئين بدون در نظر گرفتن هر گونه استانداري انجام مي شود و هر آزمايشگاهي بسته به نوع امكانات و سليقه توليدكننده متفاوت است و همين موضوع، وضعيت بازار كراك و مصرف آن را آشفته*تر كرده است.
                        در برخي موارد نيز از ضايعاتي كه نمي توان از آن هروئين خالص بدست آورد كراك توليد ميشود ، اين كراك يكي از قويترين مواد مخدر محسوب شده و بشدت اعتياد ايجاد ميكند بطوريكه طي يكماه اول مصرف دائم از آن مقدار مصرف به 3 يا 4 برابر روز اول مصرف رسيده و تعداد دفعات مصرف روزانه به 10 بار در روز (تقريبا ً هر 2 ساعت يكبار) ميرسد .
                        كراك بسيار كوچك است؛ از نخود كوچكتر. به*اندازه يك عدس حتي يك دانه ماش را به نوك سنجاق مي*چسبانند و همين *اندازه مي*تواند بارها با يك سنجاق داغ ديگر مورد استفاده قرار گيرد.
                        هرچند كوكائين زماني به عنوان ماده مخدر طبقه ممتاز شهرت داشت، اما اعتياد به كرك محدود به يك گروه سني يا شرايط اجتماعي يا اقتصادي خاص نيست و ارزان بودن و در دسترس بودن آن، كراك را همگاني كرده است و اعتياد به كراك در بسياري از كشورهاي صنعتي شده اعتياد به كراك نه تنها از سنين مدرسه، كه از هنگام تولد و توسط مادران معتاد، آغاز ميشود!
                        اين ماده مخدر صنعتي بدليل نداشتن بو و سهولت استفاده نسبت به ساير مواد مخدر باعث جذب مصرف كنندگان ساير مواد مانند ترياك گرديده است چرا كه مصرف كراك به قدري آسان است كه فرد در مدت 5 دقيقه حتي در دستشوئي و با استفاده از فندك و ني يا لوله و سنجاق مي تواند آنرا مصرف كند.

                        امتحان معنائي ندارد
                        هنگامي كه آمارهاي مربوط به اعتياد اعلام مي شود درصد زيادي به مصرف كنندگان تفنني اختصاص دارد، يعني كساني كه مواد مخدر مصرف مي كند اما هنوز معتاد نشده اند بلكه به صورت تفريحي مصرف مي كنند كه اين مورد را بيشتر مي توانيم در مورد ترياك ببينيم و همين آمارها تفكر اشتابهي را در بين جوانان موجب شده كه: ((با يكبار امتحان آدم معتاد نمي شه!))
                        اما سال گذشته از تعداد معتادان مراجعه*كننده به مركز تخصصي ترك اعتياد تهران ، 59درصد معتاد به ترياك و 24*درصد معتاد به مصرف كراك بوده*اند در بين جوانان، كراك به صورت ماده*اي كم*خطر با ميزان نشئگي بالا معرفي شده و 95درصد از مصرف*كنندگان، آن را به اسم روان*گردان مي*شناسند اما پس از شروع به مصرف، مشخص مي*شود كه كراك ماده*اي بسيار اعتيادآور است و تنها سه بار مصرف مقدار بسيار اندكي از كرك، اعتياد به آن را حتمي خواهد كرد و پس از اين زمان بسيار كوتاه، شخص را به شدت به خود نيازمند و وابسته مي كند.
                        تقريبا هرگونه حالت تحرك و نشاط روحي و جسمي كه توسط مواد اعتياد آور ايجاد شود، با حس بيحالي و لختي همراه خواهد بود و هر چقدر مقدار به اصطلاح "پرواز" شادمانه حاصل از اين سوء مصرف، بالاتر باشد، "سقوط" و احساس خماري و افسردگي پس از آن شديدتر و طولاني تر خواهد بود.
                        تدخين كرك براي شخص حس نشاط ظاهري شديدي به دنبال دارد كه حدود 5 تا 7 دقيقه طول ميكشد. اما پس از آن با افسردگي حاد، احساس بي ارزش بودن و ولع فراوان براي مصرف مجدد اين ماده، ادامه ميابد.
                        در يك دوره زماني بسيار كوتاه، اين ماده كنترل مصرف كننده را در دست ميگيرد و اين الگوي رفتاري به اعتياد شديد مي انجامد.
                        نياز به مصرف مكرر كرك به دوره هايي كه معتادان كرك آنرا binge ( مدت عياشي) مينامند، مي انجامد. در يك دوره مصرف فرد تا جايي كه پول و يا كرك در اختيار دارد و يا تا زماني كه به اغما فرو رود، به مصرف كرك ادامه ميدهد.
                        به طور كلي اثرات كوتاه *مدت مصرف كراك مشابه آمفتامين است ولي با مدت زمان كوتاه*تر، احساس افزايش انرژي، چابكي و سرخوشي زياد مي*كند ،افزايش ضربان قلب، نبض، تنفس، درجه حرارت بدن، فشار خون، گشادگي مردمك چشم، پريدگي رنگ، كاهش اشتها، تعرق شديد، تحريك و هيجان، بي*قراري، لرزش به*خصوص در دست*ها، توهمات شديد حسي، عدم هماهنگي حركات، اغتشاش دماغي، گيجي، درد پا، فشار قفسه سينه، تهوع، تيرگي بينايي، تب، اسپاسم عضله، تشنج و مرگ از عوارض مصرف اين ماده مخدر صنعتي است.
                        از جمله نشانه هاي اعتياد به كراك مي توان به :تغييرات بارز در شخصيت و رفتار، از دست دادن توجه و تمركز ، كاهش وزن، ناپديد شدن لوازم قيمتي خانه و نداشتن توضيح قانع كننده براي مقدار پول خرج شده ، رفت و آمد با افراد معتاد، آشفتگي چشمگير، رفتار كينه توزانه با افراد خانواده و دوستان ،برنامه خواب نامنظم ، بي توجهي به آراستگي ظاهري ، پارانويا شديد (سوء ظن به همه) ،بي قراري و اضطراب .

                        بايد كاري كرد!

                        سرهنگ علي تواضعي ، مديركل مبارزه با جرايم جنايي آگاهي ناجا معتقد است كه نقش مخدرهاي صنعتي در ارتكاب ديگر جرم ها بيش از گونه هاي سنتي بوده و براساس آمارها دست كم 2 برابر ديگر مواد است.
                        از آنجا كه رشد سريع مصرف مخدرهاي صنعتي موجب ارتكاب بزه هاي ديگري نيز مي شود ، اقدامي سريع و متناسب با اين آهنگ شتاب ، ضروري است.
                        كيانوش شاهرخي ، حقوقدان در اين باره مي گويد: مجلس بايد هر چه سريع تر با ارائه طرحي 2 فوريتي ، خلاء قانوني چگونگي برخورد با مخدرهاي شيميايي را رفع و مشكلات پديد آمده را حل كند.
                        محسن طاهري جبلي ، حقوقدان نيز بر اين باور است و تاكيد دارد كه متاسفانه قانون هاي موجود در زمينه مواد مخدر هنگام مواجهه با مخدرهاي صنعتي ، با سكوت و خلاء قانوني روبرو مي شوند كه اين امر خود عاملي براي تجري مجرمان ، گسترش استعمال بيشتر اين مواد و خارج از كنترل شدن جامعه مي شود.
                        اما صرف برخورد فيزيكي و قانوني با پديده مخدرهاي نوين نمي تواند كارساز باشد ، زيرا اين رويه تا كنون جاري بوده و نتيجه كاملي از آن به دست نيامده است.
                        بر همين مبنا ، دكتر اصغر مهاجري ، جامعه شناس مي گويد: براي نسل سوم به اندازه كافي كار فرهنگي صورت نگرفته است و نمود آن را مي توان امروز در سرگرداني ها و پناه بردن اين نسل به اعتيادهاي خطرناك مشاهده كرد. گام هاي رساندن جوانان به قله هاي پيشرفت ، به درستي انجام نشده و جوان مي انديشد كه اين فاصله را با عالم توهم جبران كند.
                        يكي از روزآمدترين راهكارهاي رويارويي با مخدرها در سراسر جهان ، در پيش گرفتن رويه پيشگيري است .
                        سرهنگ علي سماواتي ، رئيس مركز آموزش پليس مبارزه با مواد مخدر ناجا تاكيد دارد هنگامي كه بيشترين تبليغات قاچاقچيان و فروشندگان مخدرهاي صنعتي با عنوان هايي همچون بي خطر بودن ، عدم اعتياد آور بودن و... در كنار ارزاني و آساني تهيه آنها قرار مي گيرد ، براي رويارويي با اين مواد ، هيچ راهكاري بهتر از پيشگيري نيست.
                        اين كارشناس مبارزه با مواد مخدر ناجا مي افزايد: هم اكنون از 15 ميليون دانش آموز سراسر كشور ، 7/13 درصد در معرض مستقيم اعتياد قرار دارند كه اين موضوع اهميت آموزش و پيشگيري را دوچندان مي كند.
                        از مهم ترين و شاخص ترين مكان هاي مناسب براي پي ريزي بحث پيشگيري از گرايش به مخدرهاي صنعتي ، خانواده ها به عنوان نخستين كانون و گروه حضور فرد در اجتماع ، هستند.
                        سيما اسفندي ، روانشناس تصريح دارد كه خانواده ها به عنوان نخستين جايگاه شكل گيري و جهت دهي به شخصيت ، با فقر آموزشي ، آموزش ناقص و... كه دارند ، نقش اصلي را در گرايش نوجوانان و جوانان به مواد مخدر جديد ايفا مي كنند.
                        اما بايد توجه كرد كه هميشه راهي براي هر مشكلي وجود دارد و اعتياد به كراك نيز مستثني نيست هر چند كه راهي سخت و مشكل و البته طولاني دارد اما بهتر آن است كه مسئولان و مخصوصا والدين با آگاهي و تصميمات و رفتارهاي درست با نوجوانان و جوانان مجبور نشوند كه شاهد آزمودن و طي كردن اين راه طولاني و سخت توسط جوانان باشند.


                        • #27
                          I teach courses on modern Iranian politics and culture at Stanford University. A couple of years ago agreed to publish some of the best papers written for these classes. Last quarter, I taught a course on US relations with Iran. Mathew McLaughlin presented a fascinating, and frightening paper on the opium trade and production in Afghanistan and how it impacts Iran. Many of those who live in Iran, or who have traveled there or a brief visit, share the opinion that addiction to drugs -- from opium and heroin to crack cocaine other “designer” drugs -- is one of the most serious problems facing the country. McLaughlin’s paper looks at the problem at its source of production from the sober point of view of scholarship, and free from the frills of ideology.

                          Abbas Milani
                          Hamid and Christina Moghadam Program in Iranian Studies,
                          Stanford University

                          Opium Production and consumption in Afghanistan and Iran
                          Mathew McLaughlin
                          Stanford University

                          Preeta Bannerjee, a spokeswoman for the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), stated that Afghan opium production in 2006 “is pretty much out of control” (“UN Agency”). Whereas Afghan opium production in 1996 was estimated to be about 2,099 metric tons, the country’s opium production in 2006 is predicted to reach 6,100 metric tons -- or about 92 percent of the world’s entire opium supply (“Afghan opium”). Afghanistan’s role as the primary producer and global distributor of opium has had devastating consequences upon the populations of its neighboring countries, particularly Iran. Up to 89 percent of Afghanistan’s opium in any given year is transported through its neighbors’ borders for eventual sale in European markets (“Illicit Drugs”). Iranian drug control authorities estimate that about half of all European-bound opium is trafficked through Iran (“Illicit Drugs”). It should be no surprise, then, that Iran -- once a major producer of opium itself and now a neighbor of the world’s largest opium producer -- has struggled for decades with high rates of opiates addiction among its population. By comparing Iranian drug use statistics in 1970 and in 2000, one can observe that the number of opiates abusers (those individuals abusing either opium, heroin, or hashish) in Iran has more than tripled from about 620,000 in 1975 to at least 2 million in 2000 (McLaughlin 739-46, Raisdana, 160). Despite this bleak picture, an unlikely solution seemed to have materialized in 2000 when Afghanistan -- for reasons that are highly debated -- announced that it would begin a domestic opium elimination program. All evidence from 2000-2001 seems to point to the fact that the Taliban was sincere in its efforts. According to a UNODC 2006 report, Afghan opium production in metric tons dropped from 3,300 in 2000 to 185 in 2001 (Chossudovsky). However, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2002 ruined all hope for a quick and easy solution to Iran’s opium problems. The U.S. and its allies displaced the Taliban and replaced the regime with a decentralized government with little direct military control over Afghanistan’s population. Since then, opium production in Afghanistan has skyrocketed, and smuggling across Iranian borders is at a new historic high (Chossudovsky). Most of the blame for the rise in opium production can be placed on Washington which has refused to contribute the necessary military and monetary efforts needed to combat Afghan opium production. In the following paper, I will argue the United States’ failure to commit the needed military and monetary assets to subdue Afghan opium production has served to further chill relations between Tehran and Washington.

                          Before delving into this complex subject, I would like to discuss briefly the outline of the paper. In Part I, I discuss Iran’s history of opium addiction from 1860 to the Islamic Revolution. I will then explore in Part II the relationship between Iran’s Islamic government and opium addiction. In Part III, I discuss the rise of Afghanistan as a major opium producer. In Part IV, I explore the Taliban’s ban on opium followed by a glance in Part V at the U.S.-initiated invasion of Afghanistan and the invasion’s impact on Afghan opium production. I then explain in Part VI what the United States is doing to curb opium production in Afghanistan and suggest in Part VII that Washington’s failure to combat opium production in Afghanistan has chilled U.S.-Iran relations.

                          Part I. Iran’s Addiction to Opium From 1860 to the 1970s

                          Iranians began to develop a noticeable addiction to opium in the mid-ninetieth century. As Professor Gerald McLaughlin notes, “[a]lthough opium has existed in Iran in some form or another for centuries, widespread addiction was not known in the country until [about 1860]” (728. The rise of addiction in the 19th century can be directly linked to three events: the increased global popularity for opiates, the introduction of drug use habits by foreigners, and a sequence of natural disasters (McLaughlin 730-3). First, during the 19th century global demand for opium increased (McLaughlin 730). This increase in global demand inspired Iran -- a country where opium had grown for some centuries -- to begin “an aggressive opium export policy” (McLaughlin 730). McLaughlin states that “existing poppy fields were rapidly extended and land that had been used for [other] crops [... were] put under poppy cultivation” (730). A consequence of this expansion of opium growth was that opium became more easily accessible within Iran (McLaughlin 731). Second, during the late 19th century the Iranian government began to award foreign businesses with construction contracts (McLaughlin 732). With the arrival of foreign workers came knowledge of opium practices. For instance, British officers from the Indo-European Telegraph Company, while building a telegraph line across Iran, “provided opium to their [Iranian] workers free of charge together with instructions on how to use it” (McLaughlin 733). McLaughlin asserts that “it was about this time [after foreign workers came] that opium smoking in Iran first appeared on a wide scale” (733). However, although Iranians had easy access to opium and knowledge of opium drug use practices, they may still have lacked the motivation to use opium. This motivation materialized after a serious of natural disasters during the latter half of the 19th century. Opium use was spurred on by a famine in 1861, a plague between 1871 and 1872, and then a repeat of those two events three years later (McLaughlin 731). Opium quickly became a crutch for the Iranian people during any natural disaster, and soon the users became addicts.


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                            Addiction rates continued to climb in Iran during the 20th mainly as a result of poverty, unemployment, and understaffed healthcare. Probably the two biggest (and interrelated) reasons addiction rose in Iran was domestic poverty and unemployment (Raisdana 152). McLaughlin cites one survey done by the UN in 1975 focused on the characteristics of drug addicts in Iran; apparently, of the 100 people surveyed who were admitted into hospitals for opium addiction, 63 percent had wages less than 12 dollars a day (747). Furthermore, the spending habits of those interviewed in this survey revealed that their “earned wages and expenditures on drugs were almost equal” -- illustrating that these individuals either subsidized their habits through crime or lived in extreme poverty (McLaughlin 747). It is interesting to compare McLaughlin’s assertion as to why drug addiction began in Iran (relief from natural disasters) to Raisdana’s assertion as to why addiction continued into the 20th century. While poverty and unemployment do not possess similar features to natural disasters, the two do produce suffering at an individual level similar to the individual agony often associated with natural disasters. Another reason perhaps for the continued addiction in Iran is related to the development of an understaffed healthcare system in Iran. McLaughlin asserts that the domestic healthcare system before and during the 1970s was understaffed (729). For instance, the “physician/population ratio in Teheran [in September 1970] was one to 4,350” (729). McLaughlin asserts that the understaffed healthcare system prevalent in Iran before and during the 1970s forced Iranians to treat themselves for injuries and diseases. Iranians began to use opium “as a panacea for every ailment” (729). It is quite likely that those using opium as a panacea were those that could simply not afford to see a doctor in high demand -- a reality that reinforces Raisdana’s claim that poverty and unemployment in the 20th century sustained and promoted Iranian opium addiction.

                            It should be noted that various Iranian governments attempted to end domestic addiction to opium, but these programs failed because their mandates were either misguided or because these programs were not well organized. Certain programs that Iranian governments introduced throughout the 20th century were simply misguided; these programs focused too much on supply-side interdiction and not enough on subduing domestic demand. Considering the important role that poverty and unemployment played in sustaining and expanding the wide-scale opium addiction within Iran during the 20th century, an effective government program targeting opium addiction would probably be one that focused on curbing poverty and unemployment. A program that would probably fail would be one that ignored poverty and unemployment and focused instead upon supply-side interdiction. A look at several policies passed by Iranian governments between the beginning of the 20th century and the 1970s proves this assertion to be true. For instance, the policy passed in 1911 to ban opium importation, the policy passed in 1928 which gave the Iranian government monopoly powers of the growth and distribution of opium, the policy passed in 1955 that criminalized the production and consumption of poppy, and finally the policing programs implemented by the Shah that focused on patrolling the borders of Iran to prevent importation of opium -- all these policies failed to stop the growth of Iran’s opium addiction (Raisdana 149-152, McLaughlin 737-757). In fact, none of these policies even managed to achieve the modest goal of stabilizing opium addiction within Iran. Occasionally a policy would be passed by the Iranian government that focused on reducing domestic demand; however, these policies were often undermined by the lack of organization. For instance, the Shah in 1969 announced that Iran would begin to produce opium for the purpose of creating an opium maintenance program (McLaughlin 738. The purpose of the program was to provide opium to people deemed to be too old (over 60 years old) or infirm to go through the process of opium withdrawal. As McLaughlin notes, the program suffered from a high degree of disorganization (741). The members of the opium registry would often resell their opium to those Iranian addicts not on the registry. The government was aware of this flaw in their program, but little was done to close the loophole (McLaughlin 741). Lacking the right focus and sufficient organization, the numerous anti-addiction programs introduced before the Islamic Revolution were destined for failure.

                            Part II. Iran, Opium, and Addiction after the Islamic Revolution

                            The Islamic Revolution and the following creation of an Islamic state in Iran seemed to spell the end of opium addiction within Iran. The leaders of the revolution seemed intent upon thoroughly crushing addiction by whatever means possible. For instance, following the Islamic revolution in 1979, “Ayatollah Sadegh Khalkhali was given the responsibility of arresting and executing a large number -- probably thousands -- of addicts and sellers of opiate substances” (Raisdana, 153). Laws were passed that punished addicts and small-time drug sellers in a fashion similar to that of drug traffickers (Raisdana, 153). There would be no kind hand given to addicts; all rehabilitation centers were closed (Raisdana, 153). Finally, and probably most significantly, according to a member of the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP), “Iran, which had cultivated drugs for years, managed to eradicate [the] growing of opium poppies in a year and a half” (Gouverneur). For better or for worse, the Islamic revolution created a government that was willing to take a hard stance against domestic drug addiction.

                            Besides clamping down on the internal production and distribution of opium, the Islamic Republic has also put an enormous emphasis on border patrol -- particularly on the border between Afghanistan and itself. According to Gouverneur, “Forty-two thousand soldiers, police and militia, a tenth of Iran’s armed forces, are deployed along the eastern border, 1,950 kilometers from Turkmenistan, in the north, down to the Indian Ocean.” The main focus of these forces is to prevent the trafficking of drugs coming in from Afghanistan. Iranian anti-drug forces consistently s***mish against drug traffickers bringing drugs from Afghanistan. The Iranian Drug Control Headquarters (DCH) has claimed in some years that their forces killed up to 500 traffickers (Raisdana 153). But these military successes have come at a cost. According to, 3,000 members of Iran’s anti-drug forces have been killed while fighting these traffickers (“Iran’s Drug Smugglers”). Furthermore, there is some question as to whether the Islamic Republic’s military efforts (even coupled with its internal regulations) have been effective. While Iranian military forces have seized upwards of 250 tons of opium in a given year, the UNDCP estimates that countries only ever seize about 10 to 20 percent of incoming drugs (Gouverneur). As Gouverneur suggests, Iranian forces may be seizing high numbers of drugs per year only because there is more to seize. According to the UNDCP’s predictions, as much as 1250 tons entered Iran in 2000.

                            Like its predecessors, the Islamic republic -- despite its hard stance against opium addiction -- has struggled to lower addiction rates or stop the inflow of opium into Iran. According to Raisdana, “diminishing consumption [of opium] has been reported [... since the emergence of the Islamic Republic], but this is simply due to the fact that more and more users eat opiate substances instead of smoking them” (153). In 2000, the government released statistics that estimated there were about 1.15 million addicts in Iran and another 800,000 recreational or light users (Raisdana 159). Non-government affiliated experts at the Rehabilitation Center of Iran and the University of Social Welfare believe that the government is underestimating by about 500,000 people (Raisdana 159-160). Furthermore, these experts predict that there are additional one million to four million occasional users (Raisdana 159). With the current population of Iran estimated to be 68 million, the percentage of opium users (addicts, recreational users, and occasional users all included) could range from 2.0 to 9.5 million (Raisdana 159-60). While a comparison to earlier rates shows that the Islamic republic has succeeded in lowering the percentage of opium users in Iran, the raw numbers (even if one uses the low estimate of 2 million users) show that more Iranians than ever before are addicted to drugs. The regime has also failed to subdue the inflow of drugs through its borders. As has already been previously discussed, high drug seizures only reflect the amount of drugs entering a particular country and not the success of that drug-fighting force (Raisdana 159). And as the UNODC points out, there was about 89,726 kilograms of opiates (opium, morphine, heroin, and hashish all included) seized in Iran between January and May of 2000 (“Illicit Drugs”). After converting this amount to tons (about 98 tons) and multiplying by two since the seizure rate was only recorded for half a year in 2000, one can estimate that about between 980 to 1960 tons of opium entered Iran in 2000. Despite its hard-line stance against addiction and the importation of opiates from Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic’s efforts up until 2000 seemed to have been marred by failure. But hope would emerge in 2001 when Afghanistan declared it would be an end to its opium production.


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                              Part III. The Rise of Afghanistan’s Opium Trade

                              There was once a time not too long ago when Afghanistan was not the enormous producer of opiates it is today. In 1949, the United Nations issued a report concerning the world production of opium. In this report, Iran was chastised for being “one of the chief opium-producing and exporting countries” in the world (“Opium Production”). While the committee spent 25 lines of text outlining the threat that Iran posed to the world as a result of its opium production, half of that space was dedicated to Afghanistan’s opium production. The language of the section discussing Afghanistan was also much less fierce. Whereas Iran was chastised, the tone discussing Afghanistan’s production was quite neutral -- probably due to the fact that the committee had obtained little knowledge about Afghanistan’s production history since Afghanistan had last previously submitted records in 1937 (“Opium Production”).

                              However, Afghanistan’s role as a minor global producer of opium changed significantly after the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan annihilated the nation’s economy. According to a report on reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, “the Soviets destroyed the socio-economic fabric of Afghanistan by killing 1.3 million Afghans, expelling another 5.5 million, destroying crops and irrigation systems, bombing granaries, razing villages, mining pastures and fields, and killing livestock” (Millen). With Afghanistan’s economy destroyed, the anti-Soviet forces (the mujahideen) had little choice but to fund their war efforts by growing and selling opium (Lansford 144). According to Tom Lansford, these forces began producing and selling in such earnest that “[b]y 1984 [four years before the Soviets retreated from Afghanistan], 52 per cent of the heroin imported into the United States came from Afghanistan” (144). After the Soviets retreated in 1988, a civil war followed that further plunged the country in disarray. The trend of producing and selling opium that was started by the mujahideen in 1984 was continued by opposing forces in the civil war (Lansford 145). A look at a graph charting out Afghan opium production between 1980 and 2000 shows how Afghanistan’s opium production levels increased as the nation itself descended further into civil war (“Illicit Drugs”). For instance, according to the UNODC records, production levels jumped from 200 tons in 1980 to 1,570 tons in 1990 to 3,416 tons in 1994.

                              1994 marked an important year for Afghanistan and its involvement in opium production and distribution. In 1994, the Taliban emerged from Pakistan as a political and military force bent on taking over Afghanistan (Lansford 146-7). While the Taliban struggled at first to gain a foothold in Afghanistan, the group would eventually take over 96 percent of the country (United States Cong.). In order to fund its war efforts during the civil war, the Taliban encouraged the growth of opium within the territories it held in Afghanistan (Lansford 155-6). The Taliban would apply a 10 percent tax upon any opium produced and sold within its territories (United States Congr.). According to the Drug Trade and Terror Network Hearings in October 2001, the Taliban “[would take] in $40 million to $50 million annually [in taxes on opium production]” (United States Congr., 115). The levels of opium production and distribution reached unheard of levels under the Taliban; Washington estimates that Afghan opium sales represented 80 percent of the country’s gross national product (United States Congr., 115). For instance, in 1999, the opium produced in Taliban-held territories was estimated to be around 4,600 metric tons or “three times as much as the rest of the world combined” (Lansford, 155).

                              Part IV. The Taliban and Its Gesture to Cut Down Opium Production

                              In July 2000, the Taliban surprised the world by announcing that it would ban the production of all opium within its territories. All statistics from within Afghanistan point to the fact that this ban was sincere. According to the UNODC, only 185 tons of opium was produced in Afghanistan in 2001, compared to 3,300 tons in 2000 and 4,600 in 1999 (Chossudovsky). An anti-drug chief in Iran commented that although he was not sure why the Taliban enforced the ban he and other officers had observed a significant reduction in the amount of opium crossing into Iran (Gouverneur). Further evidence that there was a decrease to the world’s opium supply could be witnessed by observing the skyrocketing prices of opium in and around Afghanistan. In July 2000, the price of opium in the local central Asian region jumped from $44 per kilo to over $400 per kilo (United States Congr., 17).

                              Furthermore, an in-depth UN survey of opium production in Afghanistan in 2001 confirmed that the Taliban had been quite successful in reducing opium production. According to the survey, “[a]n estimated 7,606 hectares [land measurement] of opium poppy was cultivated in Afghanistan during the 2001 season [...representing] a reduction in total poppy area of 91% compared to 2000” (Annual Opium Poppy Survey). While debate emerged throughout the world as to the Taliban’s motivation for implementing the ban, it is clear that the Taliban was effective in targeting domestic opium production.

                              Two camps of thought have emerged following the July 2000 decree as to why the Taliban was willing to cut off its major source of revenue. The first camp suggests that the Taliban announced and implemented the cut in order to win international recognition, particularly from Europe where most of Afghanistan’s drugs ended up (Hutchinson). According to Martin Jelsma (a member of the Transnational Institute), the UNODC had promised that any successful ban on opium would result in the Taliban receiving 250 million dollars from the United States as well as international recognition. The offer was simply too good for the Taliban to pass up although such a ban would have significantly negative consequences upon Afghanistan’s farming interests. The second theory suggests that the opium ban was a tactical move by the Taliban in order to increase its country’s wealth as well as its own budget. This theory is heavily advocated by the United States. According to the DEA, the Taliban stopped opium production within its territories to cause a spike in opium prices so that it could reap greater revenues from its 10 percent tax on opium sales. The DEA suggests that the Taliban further profited from the ban by slowing selling off opium reserves that it had been storing yearly (United States Cong. Senate, 17-8. The DEA’s theory would seem to explain why the Taliban was intent on making yearly plans for opium eradication as opposed to a long-term commitment (Hutchinson). Yearly commitments would allow for policy flexibility concerning opium growth whereas a long-term commitment would completely eliminate the Taliban’s ability to ever profit from opium production again. While it is interesting to ponder which theory is correct, such discussion is based on hearsay because the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan would lead to the Taliban’s downfall even before 2001 ended.


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                                Part V. Operation Enduring Freedom and the Re-emergence of Afghan Opium Production

                                Following the September 11th attacks upon the United States, the U.S. demanded that the Taliban hand over the mastermind of the attacks (Osama Bin Laden) to American forces. Bin Laden had reportedly been training terrorists in Afghanistan, and the United States was aware of a strong relationship between the Taliban and Bin Laden. The Taliban refused to obey American demands, and America launched a military act (dubbed “Operation Enduring Freedom”) upon Afghanistan in retaliation for harboring a high-profile terrorist. The war’s impact on 21st century politics has been well documented, but the implications of the war upon Afghanistan’s opium production have been overlooked. Opium production has re-emerged stronger than ever due to the existence of a weak, decentralized government in Kabul and severe poverty in the agriculture sector.

                                Following the successful destruction of the Taliban regime, the United States sought to rebuild Afghan political stability by creating a strong centralized government located in Kabul. The United States began the process by appointing a transitional government, but without a strong military, the new government had no way to enforce its will in a country that had become quite fractured (“Soviet war in Afghanistan”). In light of the central government’s weaknesses, the United States and the transitional government had to rely upon a rather rocky alliance with local warlords in order to assure that Afghanistan would remain politically stable. However, the attempts to include warlords in the national building process may have been a miscalculation. According to one report on the reconstruction of Afghanistan, “[i]t may surprise some to know that the main purveyors of Afghanistan’s continued lawlessness are the warlords [with whom the United States has relied upon for political stability]” (Millen). America’s reliance upon the warlords for political stability may have given warlords the opportunity to grow and sell opium with impunity (Millen). As noted in a report, warlords will often use the money gained from producing and selling opium to finance their private militias (Millen). Until the Afghan central government can enforce its own laws without the aid of warlords, these warlords will continue participating in opium production knowing full well that the United States and its allies will not risk angering them.

                                The other factor in the re-emergence of opium production is the extreme poverty of many farmers; ironically, some of responsibility for farmers’ poverty lies with the Taliban’s ban on opium which denied farmers the ability to grow and sell their most profitable crop. According to, following the U.S.-initiated war into Afghanistan, “poor farmers devastated by war [were tempted to] turn back to the poppy and the badly needed cash it brings” (“Afghanistan’s Real War”). The same article explains that market prices for opium in 2002 were nine times higher than they were in June 2001, so any farmer who was willing to grow and sell opium in 2002 would have made a strong profit. It is interesting to note that the Taliban’s ban between 2000 and 2001 probably played a significant role in encouraging farmers to grow poppy in 2002 for two particular reasons. First, the ban raised world opium prices -- making a previously attractive cash crop even more attractive in the years immediately following the ban. Second, farmers who intended to sell opium the year of the ban were heavily in debt and had to sell opium the next year in order to pay back their debts. Having been restricted from selling their most profitable product during 2001, many farmers “who had borrowed money to cope with the drought [... prevalent in 2000 and 2001... ] found themselves unable to repay their debts [to traffickers]” (Ghobti). With debts to pay back, many farmers in Afghanistan in 2002 had an extra incentive to produce opium.

                                Kabul’s over-reliance upon warlords coupled with the economic situation of farmers following the U.S.-initiated invasion of Afghanistan essentially guaranteed a re-emergence of opium production in Afghanistan. What surprised many observers were not the return of production but the high levels of production that accompanied its return. With little domestic oversight from Kabul, warlords and farmers were free to grow and sell as much opium as they wanted. According to the UNODC, opium production levels in 2002 were greater than production levels in 2000 by 100 tons (Chossudovsky). Opium production continued its upward ascent getting as high as 4,200 tons of opium production in 2004 (Chossudovsky). A small drop-off in production in 2005 (3,800 tons) may have given some UN officials hope that opium production would level-off, but early estimates placed opium productions for 2006 at 6,100 tons -- or about 92 percent of the world’s output of opium production (Chossudovsky). With over 400,000 acres needed to produce 6,100 tons, it is clear that the coalition eradication program -- estimated to have destroyed only 38,000 acres -- is woefully unsuccessful (“Afghanistan and Opium”). Such high growth rates between 2002 and 2006 illustrates why Bannerjee’s comments at the beginning of this paper were quite accurate.

                                While opium production levels have soared since 2002 to previously unimagined heights, coalition forces have attempted to reduce opium production through economic programs. Two programs are notable for their focus on providing economic incentives for growing crops other than opium; but as will be explained, both programs had significant, unforeseen negative consequences that only reinforced opium production in Afghanistan. The first program, adopted by the British, sought to pay Afghan farmers to grow crops other than opium (Millen, 16). But the program “backfired because it prompted other farmers to start growing poppies in order to enjoy the windfall as well” (Millen, 16-17). In other words, a decrease in Afghan farmers growing poppy meant that world supply decreased and price skyrocketed -- inspiring other Afghan farmers either to grow more opium or to begin growing opium. The second strategy was adopted and executed by the United Nations. The UN’s strategy was to promote the production of wheat. However, the UN undermined its own efforts by “import[ing] wheat into Afghanistan at the same time Afghan farmers were growing wheat” -- thus driving down the domestic market price for wheat (Millen, 17). In fact, the failure of the program only served to promote the increase in poppy cultivation because the wheat market had been significantly weakened (Millen, 17). Both of these strategies relied upon only economic incentives to eliminate poppy cultivation, but in each case farmers realized that their best economic bet was to grow poppy.