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  • #16
    هفته نامه بريتانيايی اکونوميست، در شماره اخير خود به نتايج انتخابات مجلس خبرگان و نيز انتخابات شوراهای شهر و روستا در ايران پرداخته و چنين نتيجه گيری کرده که اين انتخابات نشان دهنده کاهش محبوبيت محمود احمدی نژاد است که اکونوميست از او به عنوان رئيس جمهور ستيزه جوی ايران نام می برد.
    به عقيده نويسنده مقاله، در طی ۴ سال گذشته اتفاقی که موجب خوشحالی ايرانيان ميانه روتر، شود نيفتاده بود ولی در هفته جاری آنها توانستند يک پيروزی انتخاباتی را جشن بگيرند. انتخاباتی که نتيجه آن ممکن است سبب شود از فعاليت های هموطنان تندروترشان که از محمود احمدی نژاد رئيس جمهور مردمگرايشان دستور می گيرند کاسته شود.

    اکونوميست می نويسد که نتايج اوليه انتخابات مجلس خبرگان که قدرت زيادی دارد، نشان دهنده اين است که جناح طرفدار اکبر هاشمی رفسنجاني، رئيس جمهور اسبق ايران، که عملگراست، رقيبش آيت الله تقی مصباح يزدی را که غالبا از او به عنوان معلم و مشاور آقای احمدی نژاد نام برده می شود، شکست داده است.

    در ادامه مقاله آمده است که اگر چه بهيچوجه احتمال نداشت که پيروزی افراط گرايان موقعيت آيت الله خامنه ای را که در سال ۱۹۸9 به سمت رهبر مذهبی ايران انتخاب شد به خطر بيندازد، ولی اين پيروزی می توانست سبب شود که او برای اتخاذ سياست های اجتماعی محافظه کارانه تر و سياست خارجی جنگ طلبانه تر تحت فشار قرار گيرد. ميانه رو ها از اين هم نگران بودند که آيت الله مصباح يزدی دارای يک برنامه دراز مدت برای جانشينی آيت الله خامنه ای باشد.

    نويسنده اکونوميست معتقد است که بسياری از آيت الله های سنتگرا و عملگرايانی مانند آقای رفسنجاني، نتيجه انتخابات را نشانه ترديد مردم درباره آقای احمدی نژاد با توجه به عملی نشدن وعده های اقتصادی و نيز سياست خارجی مقابله جويانه ای که ايران را در آستانه تحريم های سازمان ملل متحد قرار داده، می دانند.

    هفته نامه اکونوميست می نويسد آقای رفسنجانی از نتيجه انتخابات خوشحال خواهد بود. اکونوميست اشاره می کند که انتخابات سال ۱۹۹۳ آخرين انتخاباتی بود که او در آن پيروز شده بود و از آن هنگام تلاش هايش برای ورود به مجلس و نيز رئيس جمهور شدن دوباره با ناکامی روبرو شده بود.

    نويسنده مقاله معتقد است که آقای رفسنجاني، محمد باقر قاليباف، شهردار تهران را که مايل به تسويه حساب با آقای احمدی نژاد است، در خوشحالی خود سهيم می کند. آقای احمدی نژاد به عنوان کانديدای محافظه کاران، جای آقای قاليباف را تنها چند روز قبل از انتخابات رياست جمهوری در سال ۲۰۰۵ گرفت که موجب خصومتی شد که به تقسيم آراء محافظه کاران منجر شد.

    در پايان مقاله اکونوميست می خوانيم که پيروزی چشمگير طرفداران آقای قاليباف در انتخابات شوراهای شهر و روستا که همزمان با انتخابات خبرگان برگزار شد، ضربه ای به آقای احمدی نژاد است که چهره اش در سراسر پايتخت بر روی پوسترها ديده می شد. ولی رئيس جمهور با سرزندگي، انتخابات را يک پيروزی در برابر غرب خوانده که به گفته او، رسانه های آن به نحوی رذيلانه، ايران را کشوری غير دموکراتيک جلوه می دهد.




    Comment


    • #17
      What We Wanted to Tell You About Iran

      HERE is the redacted version of a draft Op-Ed article we wrote for The Times, as blacked out by the Central Intelligence Agency’s Publication Review Board after the White House intervened in the normal prepublication review process and demanded substantial deletions. Agency officials told us that they had concluded on their own that the original draft included no classified material, but that they had to bow to the White House.

      Indeed, the deleted portions of the original draft reveal no classified material. These passages go into aspects of American-Iranian relations during the Bush administration’s first term that have been publicly discussed by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice; former Secretary of State Colin Powell; former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage; a former State Department policy planning director, Richard Haass; and a former special envoy to Afghanistan, James Dobbins.

      These aspects have been extensively reported in the news media, and one of us, Mr. Leverett, has written about them in The Times and other publications with the explicit permission of the review board. We provided the following citations to the board to demonstrate that all of the material the White House objected to is already in the public domain. Unfortunately, to make sense of much of our Op-Ed article, readers will have to read the citations for themselves.

      The decisions of the C.I.A. and the White House took us by surprise. Since leaving government service three and a half years ago, Mr. Leverett has put more than 20 articles through the C.I.A.’s prepublication review process and the Publication Review Board has never changed a word or asked the White House for permission to clear these articles.

      What’s more, we have spent a collective 20 years serving our country as career civil servants in national security, for both Republican and Democratic administrations. We know firsthand the importance of protecting sensitive information. But we also know the importance of shared knowledge. In the entrance to the C.I.A.’s headquarters the words of the Gospel of John are inscribed, “And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall set you free.”

      National security must be above politics. In a democracy, transparency in government has to be honored and protected. To classify information for reasons other than the safety and security of the United States and its interests is a violation of these principles. It is for this reason that we will continue to press for the release of the article without the material deleted.

      Read it here :

      http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/22/op...2leverett.html



      Comment


      • #18
        GENEVA - Three U.N. human rights investigators on Wednesday said Iran was planning the imminent execution of seven Arabs sentenced to death after a secret trial.

        The investigators said in a joint statement that relatives of seven Arabs from Ahvaz, Iran, the capital of oil-rich Khuzestan province, were told earlier this week that the executions would occur "in the next few days."

        The seven were part of a larger group of Arabs arrested in June 2006 in Khuzestan on charges including intent to destabilize Iran and overthrow its government, the investigators said.

        The suspects were accused of having been trained in Iraq by U.S., British and Israeli officials, said Philip Alston, the U.N. Human Rights Council's expert on summary executions, and fellow investigators Leandro Despouy and Manfred Nowak.

        Iran executed three from the larger group of Arabs last month, they said.

        An official at Iran's mission to the U.N. in Geneva said he could not immediately comment.

        It was unclear whether the condemned Arabs were arrested in connection with two bombings that killed at least nine people in Ahvaz last year. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad blamed "the occupiers of Iraq" — inferring the U.S. and Britain — for supporting the bombers.

        The investigators conceded that those awaiting execution were accused of serious crimes, but said such suspicions "cannot justify their conviction and execution after trials that made a mockery of due process requirements."

        According to the human rights experts, lawyers were not allowed to see the defendants before the trail and faced charges of "threatening national security" when attempting to defend their clients.

        They said the convictions were reportedly based on confessions extorted under torture.

        Arabs make up less than 3 percent of Iran's population, and most live in Khuzestan.



        Comment


        • #19
          The first attempts on democracy in Iran were made more than a century ago. Ever since Iran has failed to establish itself as a democracy and pro-democracy movements have been busy talking, not so much being able of anything else. Recently there were talks of Khamenei being seriously ill, or even dead. Seriously ill he may be but it turned out that dead he is not. Any eventual death of Khamenei would probably mean his swift replacement by someone else within the Islamist circles. The Islamic regime has become quite old and experienced. The regime has evolved and entered into new stages. Enemies within have been skilfully decapitated or neutralised. The Islamic regime has become able to focus almost exclusively on external threats, being confident of its internal dominance. They are not wrong.

          Iran's Islamists are good at what they are doing and they have not been complacent. They have continuously improved their skills on how to rule an antagonised nation only having the support of less than or close to 15 to 20 percent of the population. But this small percentage may be extremely misleading. The vast majority of Iranians are opposed to the system but at the same time let's not forget that most democratic governments often have no more than 20% or less popular support and nothing happens. It is not necessary for a government to be unpopular in order to collapse or be the precursor of serious popular uprising. A government collapses when it is extremely weak from an administrative point of view. And popular revolts take place or succeed not when there is extreme dissatisfaction with the rulers but when there is a combination of favourable circumstances that lead to the rise of a significant and relatively well-organised opposition.

          Let's not forget that historically it has been possible for ruthless regimes and tyrannic dynasties to survive for hundreds of years even without any significant popular support. Iran' own history is testament to this fact as there have only been two regime-changes because of popular unrest, one of Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar and the second of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. But the territory of Iran has been ruled by hundreds of kings. These two instances of popular revolts replacing the regimes had preceded sudden liberalisation and openness that had permitted popular dissatisfaction being more easily transformed into well-organised opposition movements.

          Before the overthrow of both the Qajar king and the Pahlavi king there had started a wave of new-found tolerance toward opposition that was unprecedented and essentially inspired by outside social evolution toward democracy. These changes had permitted popular dissatisfaction being turned into organised and often militarised groups defying the incumbent regimes. Other times opposition leaders usually ended up in the gallows in a quick and scary manner that also taught lessons to other possible challengers. In 1906 or 1979 oppositions had grown loud and courageous and there were no more the previous lethal and dramatic consequences for opposition movements.

          Those unique favourable circumstances, together with the advent of technology that allowed much quicker circulation of information and propaganda and also mass movement of opposition supporters, succeeded in doing the unthinkable, to change the regimes according to the will of the people. Although the people did not get exactly what they wished for, at the end they did succeed in bringing down the regimes that had caused their revolts at the first place. The mere fact that the elite of Iranian society had not yet reached the maturity to offer democracy to the Iranian people is a separate issue. The reason there have not been many other popular revolts against leaderships has not been the lack of popular dissatisfaction but rather the effective manipulation and control of the opposition movements by the ruling regimes.

          However the Islamic regime of Iran is a master of social control. They know how to control the media and how to control the opposition movements. And for a dictatorial regime Iran's Islamists are among the most popular. Many other non-democratic regimes have no popular support. The reason is their Islamic ideology that still attracts a large number of Iran's less urbanised masses. This popular niche allows the Islamists to be partially democratic, therefore loosening the grip time to time and letting the heat off. Iran's elections are shambles, though they are much more democratic than in many other countries. And the fact that Iranians are all able to vote and choose one Islamist over another in itself is a great deal for a theocratic society to have achieved. This is a clear sign of some popular support for the regime.

          What is needed now for Iran to move toward a more democratic society? Luck, or Divine intervention, is always handy. Nevertheless it is beyond any pragmatic mind to believe that any possible sudden fall of the Islamic regime would bring true democracy to Iran. Democracy takes a very long time to be built and democracies are not necessarily supposed to be the same. Some may be generations behind others. To have any chance for establishing a system that can at some stage be called democratic first of all there needs to be a consolidated opposition to the regime. if the current regime, at this moment in time, due to some miraculous accident (for example a comet that would wipe out most of the Islamists having gathered in a stadium watching Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad wrestle) would collapse, the most probable outcome that could follow would be a long period of deep chaos, very possibly followed by civil disobedience, regional separatism, and finally some type of a mild, or serious, civil war.

          Because there would be no active and powerful opposition movement to take over. So, there is a need for a serious opposition to be created. Iran's Islamists are smart enough to know this (long before reading this article) and they are always watching the opposition carefully and surgically removing the nasty elements. The Islamists are candid in their intolerance toward un-Islamic opposition though they allow friendly competition among the moderate and hardline Islamists. This is probably going to be the weak link of the Islamic regime. If there will be favourable circumstances then it is possible that moderate Islamists will be able to gather strength and make some serious reforms through the legislature.

          Those reforms, if serious enough, would open the possibility for real change. However as long as the hardliners are powerful enough to hold their grip on key decisional posts, that are not directly chosen by the electorate, all this will be very unlikely. The hardliners are able to block candidates and also block what they deem as not-so-Islamic laws. So, the only realistic way to change will depend upon the degree to which the hardliners will be able to work together in a united fashion to block all the moderate factions. As long as hardliners are strong and united, ideologically, there is little chance for change. We can all shout that we want democracy and freedom, they will just relax and smile. And that's the reality. We've got to acknowledge that they are good at what they are doing, though they are evil due to what they are doing.

          One day the ideology and its proponents will weaken and we can only hope that it will be soon, though it can take a very long time. Pragmatic and moderate opposition among the Islamists will eventually gain strength and take over from the hardliners but when this will happen is just guesswork. Communism survived in the Soviet Union from 1922 to 1991. That is 69 years. Communism survived though it was much less democratic than Iran's Islamism. And Communism collapsed not because of popular revolts but because of the weakness of the ideology among the Communist elite. Iranians may be more keen to revolt and what Islamists have devised to combat this fiery habit of the Iranians, which brought them to power, is to let the anger release through relatively harmless elections once in a while. And these same seemingly harmless elections will probably bring about the end of the Islamic regime sooner or later.



          Comment


          • #20
            For the past couple of months the international political pressure on Iran has increased, even including a latent military threat from both its enemies Israel and the US. These current events caused the Iranian opposition to get rather excited. The bold thought of changing Iran's political regime of the clerics arouses many academic and non -- academic thinkers to put their ideas on display. Since this is a matter that gets more Iranians excited than just the people who would care to call themselves "the opposition", I find it important to explore the options so that we all know what we are talking about. And I know this equals blasphemy for an academic to say, but I hate turning simple things into difficult and complex theories and sentences that would be a bit too much to fathom for someone who is simply trying to understand the nature of this world.

            That is why I refuse to engage in a verbal weightlifting championship. I would even prefer the Kafkaesque short and staccato way of expression that is efficient enough to get the message across. We use way too many words and too few examples that could just simplify so much. Ok, so here is a go at explaining the theory of social and political change from an institutionalization point of view, which is my method of choice in this matter:

            In the alarmingly red light of the political background of this moment, one tends to fantasize about a Regime Change in Iran, obscurely -- perhaps conveniently -- leaving out the "how" part. That is why I refer to this as "fantasizing", because the theoretic one -- plus -- one that is being done by anyone who is thinking over a sudden new world order in Iran, has very little to do with reality. For the few politically engaged Iranians who now are frowning and reconsidering reading any further into this article, I would courteously ask them to stay with us and consider a different point of view and let it rain on them for a while. If after all is said and done you feel like shaking off the drops of rain, feel free.

            So, as I mentioned earlier, Regime Change -- this term has been heavily assaulted by the neocons, thank you for putting yet another word on the politically incorrect blacklist! -- has to have some kind of acceptable and human-friendly tool. And no, in this case the saying "all means justify the goal" does not count. So an external military intervention should remain far away from our list of options.

            Back to the feasible tools or means to achieve political change in a human-friendly and enduring way. A lesson in Public Policy that I always find useful is: social change -- thus including political change -- is a process and not a project! Dear reader, remember what I wrote earlier about letting the words rain on you, this would be a good time to do just that. Process, NOT Project! The reason why I emphasize so much on this is nothing more than a reaction after hearing and reading these words hundreds and hundreds of times spoken/written by politically engaged Iranians:

            For 27 years we have let the mollah's ruin our country, nobody does anything because their hands are tied, so we have to DO SOMETHING NOW! Ironically this DO SOMETHING NOW is being said since the beginning of the Islamic Revolution! That is the whole problem. You cannot just DO something in order to change a country's social, judicial and political existence! Regime change can therefore never be a project that has a beginning, middle and an end. So now that we have eliminated this thought of doing one thing in order to change Iran's regime, let us have a look at the remaining options.

            For the ones who read the last few sentences feeling some kind of aversion, I will shortly explain why a military attack, a revolution or invasion in Iran will not cause your fellow countrymen to greet you with open arms:

            The era of revolutions has passed. It is outdated. Remember the times that the news on TV was just filled with a coup d'etat here, a revolution there, "vive la resistance" ,Che Guevara and men standing in front of tanks. Those things just will not happen anymore. For you not to think that I have some crystal globe or a Jame Jam for that matter, I will explain why revolutions are not likely to take place anymore. Reasons supporting this statement regarding Iran:

            1. The generation of people who revolted against the Shah in 1979, fighting for equality and a better life (economically and politically speaking), now notice just how much of their efforts have resulted in a regime that is 1000 times worse than the previous one. Understandingly, they want to hold on to anything they have in life and support their own family avoiding anything that could endanger their safety or their breadwinning;

            2. The younger generation, who saw their brothers, fathers and friends being killed in the Iran-Iraq war need to hold on to a sense of meaning to this regime. Turning their backs to the Islamic Republic of Iran would be like treason to your schoolbooks, your teachers, your life and your God;.

            3. The more fortunate young and carefree richer part of the population, who buy their way into their own individual freedoms, they don't see a direct need into endangering their own lives by revolting against this regime while they can have all the individual freedom they want up on the ski slopes of Dizin and Shemshak;

            4. The ones remaining, the politically engaged students, the human rights and woman's rights activists, and the few intellectuals that have stayed in Iran, are too few and too valuable to risk their lives through starting a revolution on their own while having no support from the rest of the nation. The few brains that are left in Iran who are willing to invest their energy into political activism in a revolutionary way have little power to use when stuck in a dark and damp Evin prison cell.

            So revolution is not an option. Aside from the socially-based reasons I already mentioned, there is also a practical reason why a revolution would just not work in Iran. Before the existence of the Islamic Republic, Iran was ruled in a centralized manner by Mohammad Reza Shah. The power structure being central means that the Shah made all the relevant decisions. By eliminating him from the political scene, the whole power -- structure caved in like a house of cards. That made it a little easier to start a whole new government, with new decentralized power structures, as the Islamic Revolution did.

            There was a short period of chaos, but because every "Muslim" was allowed to join in the game through the mosques and local institutions, a new structure was quickly made without any to little hindrance. Only now, the power structure of Iran is a decentralized one, having politically empowered people in local places, who would not easily give up their place due to some revolution. They all work together using the bureaucratic system like a glass bell on their positions. So a revolution would only work in this case if ALL government employees, politically empowered people, clerics and politicians would be terminated all at one, which is an unthinkable option.

            So now that we have concluded that revolution in Iran as a means to Regime Change is no option, we will look at the one option that does have potency for success. The answer, dear reader, is through institutionalization. And for you who is thinking of institutionalization as in the meaning of being locked up in some sterile building without windows and having people come and drug you from time to time, no, that is not the kind of institutionalization I mean. Institutionalization means gradual domination. The ones realizing this gradual dominance are called the "drivers of change".

            Drivers of change are the people who are in positions that could alter the course of society. These do not necessarily need to be people in high governmental or political positions. It could be volunteers working for NGO's supporting human rights, women's rights, children's rights, etc. It could also be teachers, lawyers, university professors or captains of industry. These people could function as drivers of change institutionalizing values that are aimed at improving the quality of life. By the expression of "quality of life" I mean a life in which one's human rights (the ones written in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) and social and political rights are protected by the constitution and respected by the government and judiciary. This is called a Rule of Law.

            In general, institutionalization or gradual dominance occurs when the highest level of power commits itself to the goal. I state that this does not need to be the case. When change can occur from top down, it should also be possible bottom up. Since all change is performed by people, in organizations, in institutions or society in general, the direction of change could just as well ignite from the layer of people who are the ones performing their social duties. Some might call this social disobedience. This process would need support in the shape of education (for example independent courses in sociology, political science and international law), financial support (for example to set up hotlines to report human rights violations) and psychological support (for example online think -- tanks in which Iranians from all over the world can share idea's about institutionalizing social and political change).



            Comment


            • #21
              Once the drivers of change succeed in institutionalizing these new shared values, they can create a large platform from people from all parts of society who could pressure the authorities to grant them their demands. These gradual changes should be aimed at decreasing the power and influence of the clerical order and create a dominance of the people. This gradual dominance will take many years of incremental changes and needs the Iranian people to hold their breath for a long time. But through this gradual dominance, the Iranian people will have the time and chance of developing a culture that can handle a democratic and coherent political system. One could compare this process to the process of childhood, puberty and maturity. If these stages would be skipped, one would have a child wanting to act like an adult. We have seen the consequences of this after the Islamic Revolution, when all wanted something else, fought for it, and ended up with something they did not really wish for.

              Therefore I plead for a Regime Change through institutional development as a gradual dominance of the people in the societal arena, instead of a revolution or an external military intervention. I believe in this case we could draw a valuable lesson from this old Iranian expression: "rahro aan ast ke aaheste o peyvaste ravad".



              Comment


              • #22
                Iranian democracy under siege

                The solitary confinement of Haleh Esfandiari, the respected scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center, and this week's arrest of Kian Tajbaksh, an urban planning expert at George Soros's Open Society Institute, and Ali Shakheri, an Iranian-American scholar and democracy activist, are the latest signs of a clamp-down on civil society in Iran -- and on its supporters abroad.

                They are not the first prominent Iranian Americans to be imprisoned for "espionage," and they are not likely to be the last. Darioush Zahedi, professor of political science at UC Berkeley, and Ramin Jahanbeglou, a philosopher and former scholar at the National Endowment for Democracy, shared a similar fate in 2003 and 2006, respectively. They were imprisoned and forced to spend time in solitary confinement, despite any proof of wrongdoing, until they were finally released in response to international pressure.

                The serial arrests of prominent Iranian-American scholars by Iran's hardliner government come just as the Bush administration has sent the aircraft carriers John C. Stennis, Nimitz and Bonhomme Richard, part of the group of nine ships, to the Persian Gulf. This show of military strength, as well as the escalating harsh rhetoric exchanged by the U.S. and Iranian governments, arrives just prior to the Iran-U.S. talks scheduled to begin Monday in Baghdad.

                What is clear is that the government in Iran is willing to combat any effort construed as attempts at "regime change," even if it victimizes its own citizens by randomly arresting and imprisoning them without justification. These arrests are a warning to all civil society activists working to build understanding between the two countries. I have had personal experience of this.

                In 2004, I met Esfandiari in Tehran. She invited me to present a paper at the Woodrow Wilson Center. She said it was important to shed light on the activities of the younger generation, which was having a great impact on various aspects of civil society. I accepted.

                In the following months, I completed my research, finalized the paper, applied for a visa and headed for the United States in September -- only to be returned to Iran by American officials in Frankfurt, Germany, without any explanation. Soon after my return to Tehran, I was arrested by Iranian security agents and placed in solitary confinement for 55 days.

                I was interrogated numerous times about my trip to the United States, even when I told them that I never made the trip. They insisted that they had photographs and video of me in the United States lecturing against the Iranian government. "You are mistaken," I said. "Unfortunately, I -- like most of you gentlemen -- am on [America's] 'No Fly List.' "

                But they continued to question me about Esfandiari and other Iranian expatriates who invite activists to speak abroad. Chief among their concerns was whether we were paid by the U.S. government to overthrow the regime. They wanted to know our plans, and the names of others involved. Apparently satisfied that I really had nothing to reveal, I was released and eventually made my way to the United States.

                In February 2006, the Bush administration announced it would be "reaching out to the people of Iran." This entailed providing financial support to various civil society activists, universities and media. The policy elicited a flood of objections -- not from the government in Iran, but from the activists, who knew that it would only serve as another excuse for the Iranian government to suppress their efforts at democratic reform.

                The activists had long believed that democracy and social justice has to be a grassroots effort, i.e., to be developed from within the society. Meanwhile, international isolation, accentuated by economic sanctions, has only widened the gap in understanding between Iranians and the rest of the world. Esfandiari has attempted to bridge that gap -- for which she is now being punished.

                If the U.S. government truly wants to support a nascent democracy in Iran, it would have a far greater chance if it were to begin a dialogue with the Iranian government, rather than adopting wrong-headed, ill-fated outreach policies. Among other benefits, a dialogue might help persuade the Iranian government to ease up on its crackdown on democracy advocates, as well as facilitating greater communication between Iranian activists and their counterparts abroad.

                It also may create an environment for scholars in both countries to exchange ideas, to the benefit of both societies. The Islamic Republic of Iran's greatest fear is not of sanctions or military action, but of its own people, who are earnestly seeking a democratic and open society.



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                • #23
                  كاربرد مجازات اعدام از سوی جمهوری اسلامی به صورت مشمئزكننده*ای اوج گرفته است. در دو سال اخیر، تعداد اعدام*ها در ایران ركورد*های*پیشین جمهوری *اسلامی در بیش از یك دهه را شكسته است. به لحاظ عددی، جمهوری اسلامی پس از چین بیشترین اعدام*ها در سراسر جهان را به خود اختصاص داده است و به لحاظ سرانه می*تواند مدعی مقام اول در این مسابقه افتخار*آمیز باشد. جمهوری اسلامی از نظر كیفیت كاربرد اعدام (از جمله سنگسار) و طیف سنی اسیرانی كه خونسردانه اعدام می*كند (از جمله كودكان بزهكار) نیز در دنیا مقام بی*نظیری را نصیب خود كرده است. در سال*های اخیر، این اعدام*های *وحشتناك كه گاه به صورت گله*ای صورت می*گیرد موجی از اعتراض و محكومیت را هم در سطح ملی و هم در سطح بین*المللی از سوی نهادهای حقوق بشری و جامعه جهانی برانگیخته است، ولی جمهوری اسلامی با یك دهن*كجی بی*نظیر نه فقط وقعی به این اعتراض*ها نداده و بلكه بر دامنه قساوت خود افزوده است - و این مسئله بیش از هر چیز مشمئزكننده است.
                  گزارش اعدام*ها در ایران خسته كننده شده است. كمتر روز و هفته*ای است كه اسیری در این یا آن گوشه كشور دست بسته كشته نشود. اگر در گذشته نزدیك، این اسیركشی*ها تك تك در این جا و آن*جا صورت می*گرفت، اكنون دسته دسته سر به نیست می*شوند. بنا به گزارش*ها(۱) در طول كمتر از دو هفته گذشته ۴۸ نفر در ۸ شهر ایران اعدام شده*اند. در تابستان گذشته نیز تنها در یك روز ۲۹ نفر در زندان اوین گله*وار به دار آویخته شدند. صحبت یكی دو نفر نیست. صحبت ده*ها نفر است. صحبت افرادی غالبا بی نام و نشان است. صحبت كسانی است كه یا نام و نشانی از آنان داده نمی*شود و یا فقط با حروف اختصاری یا اسم كوچك از آنان یاد می*شود. گویی این قربانیان انسان نیستند، نام و نشان ندارند، بی كس و كارند، غمخواری ندارند و با مرگشان كسی به عزا نمی*نشیند و یا خانواده*ای امید و عزیز و سرپرست یا نان*آور خود را از دست نمی*دهد. درست كه بسیاری از قربانیان ماشین اعدام جمهوری اسلامی افراد مفلوكی هستند كه در بهشت این نظام به جنایت و خشونت آلوده شده*اند و طعمه*های سهل*الهضمی برای تأمین اشتهای سیری ناپذیر ضعیف*كشی این نظام بشمار می*روند، ولی اینان در برابر جانی كه می*دهند حتا از این حق كه نامشان برده شود نیز برخوردار نمی*شوند.

                  گسترش موج اعدام در ایران به حد و كیفیتی* كه درسطح جهانی كاملا بی سابقه است بارها مورد اعتراض فعالان و سازمان*های حقوق بشری و جامعه جهانی در سطح جهان قرار گرفته است. در یكی دو سال اخیر ده*ها اطلاعیه از سوی این نهادها و هم*چنین حكومت*های دموكراتیك غرب (به شمول كشورهای آمریكای شمالی و اتحادیه اروپا) و سازمان ملل در محكومیت این اعدام*ها صادر شده و از حكومت ایران خواسته شده است كه به این اعدام*های بی*رویه و به خصوص اعدام كودكان بزهكار و كاربرد سنگسار خاتمه دهد. رژیم ایران در برابر این اعتراض*ها معمولا انعطافی در رویه خود نداده و بلكه غالبا كاربرد اعدام در انواع آن را گسترش داده است. البته موارد انگشت*شماری* بوده كه فشارهای داخلی و یا بین*المللی به لغو حكم اعدام این كودك بزهكار یا آن زن ستمدیده منجر شده است. ولی در مجموع، این فشارها مانع از آن نشده است كه تعداد كل اعدام*ها و اعدام كودكان بزهكار، یا سنگسار كاهش یابد. این نوع دهن*كجی در برابر اعتراض*های مكرر جهانی تقریبا در مورد هر كشور دیگری در جهان بی*سابقه است.

                  در جهان امروز كشورهای ناقض حقوق بشر كم نیستند و یا موارد نقض حقوق بشر تنها به كشورهای خاورمیانه*ای، مسلمان یا جهان سومی محدود نمی*شود. ولی در كشورهایی كه از یك نظام نسبتا ثابتی برخوردار هستند یك هنجار عام وجود دارد: این كشورها به هر درجه از نقض حقوق بشر هم كه آلوده باشند غالبا در برابر فشارهای جامغه بین*المللی از خود واكنش مثبت نشان می*دهند، و در نتیجه در طول زمان از شدت عمل آنان در نقض حقوق بشر كاسته می*شود. این قاعده عام حتا در مورد چین و عربستان (دو تا از بزرگترین نقض*كنندگان حقوق بشر در جهان) نی*ز صادق است. تنها كشورهایی كه دستخوش بی*ثباتی*های سیاسی هستند و جنگ داخلی یا شورش و ناامنی در آن*ها حاكم است (مثلا سومالی و كنگو) در مقابل فشارهای بین*المللی در مورد نقض حقوق بشر بی*تفاوت می*مانند و نمی*خواهند یا نمی*توانند از خود واكنش مثبتی نشان دهند. از این قاعده كلی ظاهرا تنها جمهوری اسلامی مستثنا است:* نظامی* كه ۳۰ سال مداوم بر ایران حكومت می*كند و اركان سیاسی، نظامی و امنیتی خود را تثبیت كرده است و در عین حال هم*چون یك نظام كودتایی یا بی*ثبات در برابر جامعه جهانی عمل می*كند. جمهوری اسلامی ظاهرا تنها نظام تثبت شده در جهان است كه در برابر اعتراض*های* جهانی* به نقض حقوق بشر مرتبا بر دامنه آن می*افزاید.

                  این واقعیت، یكی از دردناك*ترین و مأیوس*كننده*ترین جنبه*های برخورد نهادهای حقوق بشری با رژیم ایران بشمار می*رود. سازمان*های حقبوق بشر بین*المللی غالبا از واكنش*های ضد انسانی و بی*رحمانه رژیم ایران می*نالند. آنان در جهان متمدن امروز از همه نظام*های جهان انتظار برخوردی انسانی و متمدنانه دارند. تجربه آنان نیز نشان داده است كه تقریبا تمامی نظام*های تثبیت*شده جهانی در برابر اعتراضات و تذكرات حقوق بشری برخوردی محترمانه می*كنند و به تدریج از دامنه تعدیات حقوق بشری خود می*كاهند. در مورد ایران، اما آنان تجربه دیگری دارند. می*بینند كه نمایندگان ایران در سازمان ملل كشتن كودكان بزهكار را منكر می*شوند یا مقامات قضایی علیه آن بخشنامه صادر می*كنند، و بعد نمونه*های مكرر آن گزارش داده می*شوند. به تكرار می*شنوند كه مجازات سنگسار منع شده است و بعد گزارش می*آید كه این جا و آن*جا افرادی سنگسار شده*اند. بارها علیه مجازات*های اعدام پس از محاكمات ناعادلانه و بر اساس اعترافات اخذ شده زیر شكنجه و زور و تهدید اعتراض می*كنند و بعد می*خوانند كه این نوع اعدام*ها وسیعا افزایش یافته است. این نوع برخورد رژیم ایران كه با هیچ یك از موازین انسانی جامعه مدرن هم*خوانی* ندارد نهادهای حقوق بشری را مستأصل كرده است.

                  ادبیات سازمان*های حقوق بشری در رابطه با ایران از امید آنان به برخوردهای انسانی و متمدنانه رژیم ایران حكایت می**كند. آنان تعهدات حقوقی بین*المللی *ایران را به مقامات جمهوری اسلامی یادآور می*شوند، از اصول اولیه حقوق بشری برابری انسان*ها صرف نظر از جنسیت و عقیده، و آزادی *بیان و عقیده یاد می*كنند، ارزش*های*انسانی رعایت حق حیات و نفی* شكنجه و برخوردهای انسانی با مجرمان و محكومان را پیش می*كشند، و روندهای جهانی در جهت رعایت ارزش*های *حقوق بشری و لغو اعدام را مطرح می**كنند. آنان فرض را بر این می*گذارند كه مقامات ایران مثل هر انسان با احساس و با وجدان امروزی از سنگسار متنفرند، اعدام كوكان بزهكار را بد می*دانند، به یك نظام قضایی عادلانه معتقدند و تبعیض را بد می*شمارند. از این رو، در فراخوان*های خود از مقامات می*خواهند كه این اصول را به مرحله اجرا بگذارند و یا با چشم*انداز لغو اعدام در ایران احكام اعدام را به خصوص در مورد كودكان بزهكار متوقف كنند (غافل از این كه این مقامات چشم*اندازی برای لغو اعدام در ایران نمی*شناسند و حكم اعدام را ابدی می*شمارند). واكنش مقامات ایران در برابر این برخورد انسانی و متمدنانه نهادهای حقوق بشری كه غالبا با تعمد در افزایش خشونت و نقض حقوق بشر همراه می*شود به شدت مشمئز كننده است.

                  واقعیت امر آن است كه هیئت حاكمه ایران از فرهنگ عقب*افتاده*ترین لایه*های اجتماعی ایران كه به دنیای پیشامدرن وابسته است نمایندگی می*كند - فرهنگی كه هم*چنان اصرار دارد ارزش*های 14 قرن پیش را بر جامعه امروز ایران تحمیل كند. در برابر این فرهنگ، زبان متمدنانه نهادهای حقوق بشری بین*المللی برایی چندانی* ندارد. متأسفانه، جامده مدنی* ایران نی*ز كوشش زیادی برای مقابله با این فرهنگ از خود نشان نمی*دهد و این امر به نوبه خود هیئت حاكمه را به ادامه رفتار*های قرون وسطایی*اش تشویق می*كند. برای* نمونه، صداهایی كه در اعتراض به سنگسار و اعدام و اعدام كودكان بزهكار در ایران بلند می*شود هنوز بسیار محدود است. تنها در صورتی كه این صداها در ایران بلندتر و بلندتر شود می*توان امید داشت كه سرانجام بتواند هیئت حاكمه را به عقب*نشینی وابدارد و بر روی* عملكرد آن تأثیر بگذارد. كانون*های وكلا، مثلا، در غالب كشورهای جهان در صف مقدم مبارزه با مجازات اعدام قرار دارند، ولی *در ایران فقط اقلیت كوچكی از وكلای دادگستری به این مبارزه پیوسته**اند. از این رو، باید از نامه ۱۵۰ تن از وكلای *دادگستری خطاب به رییس قوه قضاییه (۲) برای* توقف اعدام كودكان بزهكار استقبال كرد، و امید داشت كه این وكلا تلاش خود را برای لغو مجازات* اعدام به طور كلی توسعه دهند و سایر وكلای دادگستری نیز به آنان بپیوندند.

                  جامعه ایران سه دهه تمام را زیر حاكمیت نظامی گذرانده است كه با تمام قوا تلاش كرده تا ارزش*ها و هنجارهای ۱۴ قرن پیش را بر این جامعه تحمیل كند. محصول این تلاش، نقض وسیع قانونی و فراقانونی حقوق بشر در ابعاد وسیع، وحشتناك و خشونت*بار آن بوده است. تلاش سازمان*ها و نهادهای بین*المللی حقوق بشر اثر بسیار كمی در تعدیل رفتار حاكمیت در زمینه حقوق بشر داشته است. از آن سو، جامعه مدنی كه به خصوص در یكی دو دهه اخیر در ایران رشد كرده كمتر به مبارزه حقوق بشری در سطح عمومی (و نه فقط در سطح خصوصی نخبگان جامعه) اعتنا ورزیده است. این بی*اعتنایی جامعه مدنی به حقوق بی*نوایان و مفلوكان جامعه ( كه در سكوت در برابر اعدام*های روزافزون اخیر متجلی می*شود) حكومت را در ادامه و تشدید نقض حقوق بشر جری*تر كرده است. وقت آن است كه جامعه مدنی* ایران به سكوت خود در برابر این فجایع خاتمه دهد و از حقوق بشر در كلیت و جامعیت آن دفاع كند. تنها در این صورت می*توان به پیش*برد وضع حقوق بشر در ایران و عقب*نشینی حاكمیت از ارزش*ها و هنجارهای قرون وسطایی آن امید بست. و گرنه با شروع دهه جدیدی از حاكمیت جمهوری اسلامی ما باید هم*چنان شاهد وقوع كشتارها و سنگسارها و انواع دیگر خشونت*هایی كه این حاكمیت برای مردم ایران به ارمغان آورده است باشیم.




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                  • #24
                    Omid Memarian, Roozbeh Mirebrahimi, Shahram Rafizadeh, Javad Gholamtamimi
                    Four Journalists Sentenced to Prison, Floggings

                    International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran (New York, February 10, 2009) The sentencing of four Tehran bloggers by Iran’s Judiciary Court on February 3, 2009, to prison terms, fines and flogging, despite the head of the judiciary’s admission that they had been coerced into confessing, violates their right to a fair trial, Human Rights Watch and the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran said today. The four said shortly after their arrest in 2004 that they had been tortured during interrogation, but there has been no public investigation into these allegations despite a high-level promise to do so.

                    Authorities arrested Omid Memarian, Roozbeh Mirebrahimi, Shahram Rafizadeh, and Javad Gholamtamimi in September and October 2004, and detained them without charge. The four said that they were subjected in detention to physical and psychological abuse, as well as prolonged periods of solitary confinement in a secret detention center without access to counsel or family. Three of the men subsequently described the abuse at a meeting with Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, the head of the judiciary. On April 20, 2005, a judiciary spokesman said that an official investigation confirmed that their confessions had been coerced. “The interrogators and prosecutors committed a series of negligent and careless acts in this case that led to the abuse of the detainees’ words and writings in producing confession letters,” the spokesman said.

                    “These sentences are shocking, given that the head of the judiciary himself admitted the evidence had been obtained by coercion” said Joe Stork, deputy director of the Middle East division at Human Rights Watch. “The judges should be investigating and prosecuting abusers, not their victims.”

                    Human Rights Watch and the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran called on the Tehran Appeals Court to overturn the sentences, and on the government to investigate the torture claims.

                    The four journalists were released on bail in late 2004. Memarian, Mirebrahimi, and Rafizadeh subsequently left Iran and are living abroad. Gholamtamimi resides in Iran.

                    Judiciary authorities informed lawyers for the four on February 4 that Branch 1059 of Tehran’s Judiciary Court sentenced them each to prison terms of up to three years and three months, and to be flogged. Memarian was also fined 500,000 tomans (US$520). The known charges against them include “participating in the establishment of illegal organizations,” “membership in illegal organizations,” “propaganda against the state,” “disseminating lies,” and “disturbing public order.” Gholamtamimi was also charged with treason.

                    The lawyers for the four include the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Shirin Ebadi, who told Human Rights Watch and the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran that they would “definitely appeal” the sentences.

                    Memarian, Mirebrahimi, and Rafizadeh met with Ayatollah Shahroudi on January 10, 2005, and described physical and psychological torture at the hands of a specific interrogator, whom they said identified himself as “Keshavarz” (farmer). They said the magistrate in charge was known as “Mehdipour.”

                    “We trusted Shahroudi,” said Mirebrahimi, who worked as a consultant with Human Rights Watch in 2008. “He told us, ‘Don’t tell anyone what happened to you in prison and I promise I will solve the problem.’”

                    The apparent purpose of the abuse was to extract confessions that implicate reformist politicians and civil society activists in activities such as spying and violating national security laws [see Human Rights Watch]. According to the three men, both the interrogator and the magistrate repeatedly delivered messages and threats to the detainees on behalf of the chief prosecutor of Tehran. Shahroudi’s spokesman announced on January 12, 2005 that, “Shahroudi has issued a special order to investigate and probe these [detentions]. If any of the detainees’ allegations, at any level, are true then we will prosecute the violators.” To date, the government has not made the full findings of any investigation public, nor has it announced any penalties or prosecution for the abuse.

                    “Either the Iranian judges are not listening to Ayatollah Shahroudi, or he has reneged on his promise to investigate the torturers and not the bloggers,” said Hadi Ghaemi, coordinator of the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran. “These brave journalists stood up for their rights. It’s high time the Iranian judiciary stood up for justice.”

                    Human Rights Watch and the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran have documented extensive patterns of forced confessions, arbitrary detentions, and prison torture against opposition political activists, journalists, and anyone perceived as a critic. ()/www.hrw.org.

                    For the latest human rights developments in Iran visit the Campaign’s website at www****anhumanrights.org.

                    For more information, please contact:

                    In Washington, DC, Joe Stork (English): +1-202-612-4327; or +1-202-299-4925 (mobile)
                    In New York, Hadi Ghaemi, (English, Persian): +1-917-669-5996 (mobile)



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